The central idea worth identifying in utopian thought is human perfectibility — the claim that a properly designed society can make people good, and that this justifies designing society in detail. I agree that institutions shape character, John Rawls's 1971 A Theory of Justice makes that assumption explicit. I disagree that the shaping can be finished, and every comprehensive blueprint I have examined smuggles coercion into the plan. Read the blueprints and the coercion shows up first in labor allocation and last in the criminal code.
That verdict matters because the question is usually taught as a survey of island fantasies. It isn't. Once you isolate perfectibility as the load-bearing premise, the famous failures stop looking like bad luck and start looking like predictable design faults. Arthur Morgan, who ran the Tennessee Valley Authority's planned communities, wrote about this with unusual honesty after watching intentional communities collapse around him. His conclusion was not that planning fails but that plans outlive the people they were built for.
What follows is the identification, the argument on each side, and a working test you can apply to any scheme that claims perfectibility, from More's 1516 book to a modern charter city proposal.
Perfectibility Is the Idea That Makes Every Blueprint Work
Thomas More's Utopia, published in 1516, opens with a complaint so specific it reads as a diagnosis: England's sheep "eat up men." Enclosure had converted arable land to pasture, and More had watched villages emptied for wool. His 54 cities of 6,000 households each are a direct response to that chaos, and the household cap is where the design logic begins to show.
The island's institutions are engineered to remove the causes of vice rather than punish the vices themselves. Nobody owns private property, everybody works, and the working day is capped at six hours because idleness is treated as a policy failure. Two hours of lecture before dawn, dinner at five, eight hours of sleep. The schedule is fascinating because it assumes the problem is bad incentives, not human nature.
That assumption is perfectibility in operational form. Change the incentives, and character follows. More was writing in Latin for a humanist audience familiar with Plato's Republic, and the fictional framing let him argue for ideas that would otherwise have read as sedition against Henry VIII's England.
Catch the conditional, though. More never says the arrangement produces good people. He says a traveler told him about it. The book's second half reads as a report, and the reporter is a character, not the author. A careful reader cannot extract a policy commitment from it, which is why the word "utopian" later migrated from satire to aspiration.
More's 54 Cities Trading Private Property for Predictability
The physical plan is rigid in ways that repay close reading. Each city sits on a river, is ringed by farmland, and is subdivided so that no household is more than a short walk from open country. Every 30 families elect a magistrate called a syphogrant annually, and every 10 syphogrants answer to a tranibor, chosen yearly by secret ballot. The political layer is more representative than most sixteenth-century European states.
Property abolition cuts both ways. The 6,000-household cap holds population steady by moving surplus families to found new colonies on the mainland; if the island's population falls, colonists come back. Gold is used for chamber pots and chains. The design treats prestige competition as the engine of most crime and simply switches it off.
What I agree with here is the diagnosis, not the cure. Enclosure genuinely immiserated people, and material security genuinely reduces acquisitive crime. Modern cash transfer studies in low-income countries report measurable reductions in petty theft after transfers begin, which is close to More's point about eliminating want.
What I disagree with is the assumption that the state can decree preference away. The ban on meatless meals and the standardized housing imply a ministry of taste that no sixteenth-century administration could staff, and few modern ones could either.
Agree: Institutions Really Do Shape Character
The strongest defense of perfectibility comes from Rawls, who argued in 1971 that the basic structure of society is the primary subject of justice precisely because institutions have "profound effects" on how people turn out. Written in response to utilitarianism, it treats selves as formed by the arrangement, not simply housed by it. That is hard to argue against.
The mechanism runs through ordinary incentives. If a workplace pays a living wage and guarantees leave, parents spend time with children. If the tax code punishes marriage, fewer people marry. If courts enforce contracts quickly, trust becomes cheap and strangers can trade without kinship. Every one of those claims is empirical and mostly supported.
A sharp demonstration is the unexpectedly large response to low, well-structured rewards. According to economists Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo, in Poor Economics (2011), their randomized evaluations in Indian and Kenyan programs found villagers responded strongly to small, low-cost nudges, from dividing deworming pills among classmates to reminding parents about immunizations. That's a nudge, not a reworking of the human soul.
Condition matters: institutions shape what people do under a given rule set. They do not produce a fixed type underneath the rules. The moment the rule set changes, the character changes with it, which is exactly what More's six-hour day would predict.
Disagree: Frictionless Hierarchy Becomes Mild Coercion
The distribution of labor is where the island's charm wears thin. More assigns the dirty work to enslaved war captives and condemned criminals, and the 6,000-household balance depends on that underclass. How precisely did More think chattel slavery could coexist with his six-hour day? Very carefully: the enslaved do the work the free citizens are too good for, so the schedule works.
That is not an incidental flaw. The six-hour day pays for itself by exporting unpleasantness. Socialists who cite Utopia as an ancestor are citing a text that solved its labor problem by importing it. The same exact trade appears in later villages: the commune runs because someone, often women or out-of-favor members, does the work nobody wants.
Note how softly the coercion is introduced. Nobody in Utopia is whipped into the fields. The rules simply assume a class of people who do not get the six hours. When you read a today's charter city proposal, look for which rule quietly assumes a second class.
Labor Rotations, Timetables, and the Problem of the 6,000-Household Rule
More's city is a machine for distributing people as much as goods. The household is the unit of work, the family is moved between city and countryside in rotation, and children drift to trades they like without ever being asked whether they want an agricultural season. The rotation is described as fair, and in balancing urban and rural lives it is.
The timetable is where the perfectibility assumption shows most clearly. Six hours is enough work only if the inputs and the output distribution are already flawless: no spoilage, no transport failure, no harvest disaster, no political noncompliance. Any breakdown and the hours creep back up. That is a design with zero slack.
A concrete failure path. Suppose a harvest fails in one district. More's cities are self-sufficient in food, so the shortfall must cross district lines through an exchange the island's magistrates coordinate. No district-level buffer exists, and the 30-family magistrates have no budget for importing grain. The scene would be a market that should have been busy, and granaries that already exported their stores; meaning no reserve to open in the fields that actually failed.
I would keep the horizontal mobility and the six-hour target. What I would change is the assumption that a perfect operating year is the baseline. Real plans carry slack. Utopia has none.
Why the Blueprint Problem Returns in Every Modern Attempt
The word "utopia" was coined by More, and every subsequent failed community inherits his structure: a founder, a detailed plan, an assumption that the plan captures the human good. The Shakers, Robert Owen's New Harmony in Indiana, and the Fourierist phalanxes all drew on the same logic in the nineteenth century. They did not fail because the people were bad. They failed because the plans treated members as variables.
Morgan's account of the TVA communities is the clearest first-hand example. He writes in The Community of the Future and the Future of the Community (1957) that people who moved into the planned towns would adopt the plan and then change it: they added porches, altered streets, repurposed the common spaces. The designers' assumption, that residents would live in the design, was falsified by residents who moved in and kept moving.
Edward Bellamy's Looking Backward (1888) is instructive because it is a novel with a government, a schedule, and an industrial army, and because readers loved it. Populist clubs in the United States debated whether the book's system could be realized, and a significant number of Americans wrote asking to be told when the new order would arrive. I find it a useful warning about how a blueprint can attract compensating passion.
The stable lesson from these attempts is not that communities fail. It's that plans that assume they are narrow become fragile the moment a real person adds a porch. Bellamy's readers added porches too, rhetorically.
A Reading Test You Can Apply to Any Proposed Utopia
Here is a practical method. Apply it to More, to Bellamy, to a modern charter city proposal, or to a friend's plan for a perfect neighborhood. The test has three checks.
Ask first what the plan requires people to want. A plan that requires people to want the six-hour day or the communal dining hall is different from one that works on their existing wants. More requires the first and borrows from the second.
Ask second where the plan exports unpleasantness. Find the labor the plan avoids, and name who does it. More's enslaved captives are the clearest case; the modern equivalent is often contract labor or, more commonly, women's unpaid labor. Any scheme that claims it has eliminated drudgery without a distribution of the drudgery is either mistaken or hiding someone.
Ask third what happens when one assumption fails. If the plan has no slack, no exception, and no way to change itself, it is a plan for a perfect year and will fail in an ordinary one. This third check is the one that caught the Shakers and the TVA towns.
Apply the test to Any scheme. If it survives all three checks, it is at least an attempted institution rather than a wish, and it deserves a fair hearing. More's own book, read this way, becomes a charming but flawed prototype, not a template.
The Case for Perfectibility: TVA, Public Health, and the Falsifiable Core
The strongest version of the perfectibility side is an engineering argument. Arthur Morgan built the TVA's planned towns around a similar faith: improve the conditions, and people would improve within them. He was not naive; his 1957 book is a candid report from the experiment by someone whose view had changed.
Take the modern equivalents seriously. Universal immunization drove smallpox from the earth by 1980, according to the World Health Organization's own eradication record. Iodized salt cut goiter rates in the United States and elsewhere. Public libraries and compulsory schooling raised literacy in wealthy countries over the twentieth century. These are architecture changes, not character changes, and they worked.
The remaining question is whether better character followed. The evidence is thinner. Improvements in education and income are well documented. Changes in the underlying acquisitive core of human nature are not, and the difficult cases, from waning compliance with public health rules to the persistence of fraud in well-governed states, persistently falsify the strongest form.
Final Analysis: Reject Completion, Keep the Design Impulse
My position is split at the seam. I accept the premise that people are partly made by their institutions, and I reject the conclusion that perfect institutions therefore produce perfect people. What follows from that split is modest: design better rules, expect the rules to change with the people, and leave a door open for the people to change the rules.
A utopia that claims to have finished is a storage room for the souls nobody knows. A utopia that claims to have begun is already uncomfortable, and its designers had better have read their Morgan.
FAQ
What is the central idea of utopia in Thomas More's 1516 book?
In More's Utopia, the central idea is that a society of shared property, universal work, and six-hour days removes the conditions that make people vicious. The claim is that institutions, not souls, make most crime. Any critique of the idea that perfectibility is the only thing holding the island together will notice that the six-hour day is funded by enslaved captives.
Is perfectibility the same as utopianism?
Perfectibility is the premise that institutions can finish the job of making people good. Utopianism is the literary and political genre that assumes that premise. Not every utopia is perfectibilist, and More's own book is arguably a satire rather than a program, but the two words get used interchangeably in lecture courses and in popular debate.
What is the most common critique of utopia as a genre?
The most cited critique is the one Popper made in The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945): large-scale social engineering towards an ideal state is totalitarian because it requires the removal of people who disagree with the goal. Karl Popper put it that way after watching the twentieth century. The critique is historically grounded but it applies to complete plans, not to all reform.
Can utopia be achieved in the real world?
Small versions have existed for short periods, from the Shakers' communities to Israel's kibbutzim in the twentieth century, and most have either dissolved or changed beyond recognition. The successful cases tend to be partial: a town, a school, a cooperative, and they succeed by adapting rather than by sticking to the plan. Full-state utopias, from the Soviet project to the charters, have not had comparable results.
What was the Six Hour Day in More's Utopia?
More's Utopia sets the working day at six hours and adds two hours of pre-dawn lectures, a dinner at five, and eight hours of sleep. A rotation keeps families on farms and citizens in the cities. The schedule depends on slavery and on no harvest failure. In a real year, those assumptions fail and the hours creep back up.
Is Bellamy's Looking Backward a utopia or a critique?
It is a utopia from the inside, with a government and a schedule and an industrial army, published in 1888. Readers loved it so much that populist clubs debated when to realize it. The text is not a critique; the critique of it is that the book presumes the plan will remain fixed as people arrive inside it and change it, which they inevitably do.
Why did early Readme-style planned communities fail?
The Shakers and Owenite and Fourierist experiment all failed for similar reasons: they bound members' productive and personal behavior to a fixed rule set, assumed a plan at a scale the members would not enforce, and then ran out of commitment. Their rhetoric was universal and their membership was voluntary, which makes their failure a fairly clean test of the perfect plan itself.
This article is general educational information, not a diagnosis, treatment plan, legal opinion, or investment recommendation. It does not promise that any institution, policy, or community will produce perfect people or perfect outcomes. Consult a qualified local professional before making decisions about policy, community, or finance based on it. If you are in immediate danger or at risk of self-harm, contact your local emergency services or crisis line.