Andrew Johnson's leniency toward former Confederates and his vetoes of civil rights and relief legislation angered Radical Republicans because together they handed the old Southern ruling class a path back to power while leaving four million freedpeople without land, protection, or federal backup. The two policies were not separate missteps. Johnson's blanket amnesty proclamations, his rapid pardons, and the state governments he recognized in 1865 produced the Black Codes; his vetoes of the Freedmen's Bureau and Civil Rights bills in 1866 signaled he would not stop them. The result was a direct collision with Congress that ended in his impeachment.
The Amnesty Proclamation of May 29, 1865 Set Sixteen Excluded Classes
On May 29, 1865, roughly six weeks after Appomattox, President Johnson issued a proclamation granting amnesty and pardon to nearly all Confederates who would swear an oath of loyalty to the Union. The text excluded sixteen specific classes of persons from the offer, including civil and diplomatic officers of the Confederacy, judges, West Point–trained officers who had resigned to join the rebellion, and persons owning taxable property valued at more than $20,000.
The property threshold is the detail modern summaries tend to skip. The $20,000 figure was a rough cutoff for the planter class, and because enslaved people were counted as property in the 1860 census, the threshold captured precisely the wealthiest slaveholders. Those men were not automatically barred forever; they simply had to apply for individual pardons.
The proclamation's structure mattered because it shifted the question of who re-entered political life from Congress to the president personally. Johnson could grant or withhold special pardon at his own discretion. The oath was available to most small farmers and mechanics, but the planter elite and Confederate leadership had to humble themselves before him.
Within weeks, Johnson's policy became more generous in practice than the proclamation text suggested. He issued hundreds of special pardons in quick succession under a broad reading of his power.
Johnson Granted Roughly 1,000 Special Pardons in 1865 Alone
The clearest measure of leniency is volume. Johnson issued special pardons to about 1,000 former Confederates during 1865, according to historian Eric Foner's account of the period in Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution. Within the first eight months after taking office, the number of individual pardon applications granted ran into the hundreds and climbed steadily.
Historian Brooks D. Simpson, in Let Us Have Peace, traced how Johnson personally received pardon petitioners at the White House and granted them with little apparent screening for past conduct. Applicants included former cabinet secretaries of the Confederacy, generals, and planters whose property had been seized. The pardon restored not just civil rights but often claims on abandoned property.
The practical effect was that the men who had led secession were back in public life by the time Congress reconvened in December 1865. When the 39th Congress assembled, many of the Southern representatives seeking seats had been Confederate officials.
Johnson's calculation was that those men could simply reclaim their positions with loyalty oaths. By December 1865 Johnson was telling Congress that the states had returned to their proper relation to the Union. He said so before those state governments had done anything to protect the freedpeople.
The $20,000 exemption was also rendered nearly meaningless for planters who applied. Simpson documented that Johnson pardoned planters who had certainly been covered by the excluded classes. A special pardon had a specific price for the applicant: the obligation to make personal pilgrimage to Washington and ask the president directly.
The Provisional Governments He Recognized Passed the Black Codes in 1865
Johnson's state-building mattered more than his pardons. In 1865 he appointed provisional governors for the Southern states and authorized conventions whose delegates were chosen under rules that largely left freedpeople without the ballot. Those conventions produced constitutions that repudiated secession and ratified the Thirteenth Amendment, and they also handed the states back to old elites.
The new state legislatures then enacted the Black Codes across 1865 and early 1866. Mississippi's law passed in November 1865 required freedpeople to have written proof of employment and penalized vagrancy with fines and involuntary labor; South Carolina's code barred freedpeople from most occupations and from testifying in cases involving whites. The codes varied by state but shared a core purpose: restoring labor control.
Johnson's role was not indifference. His administration's State Department returned confiscated property to former owners, and the Freedmen's Bureau, created in March 1865, found its authority contested. Freedpeople who expected the famous forty acres were told that the land was being restored.
This is why historians link Johnson's leniency to the codes. The same men he pardoned returned to the statehouses where the codes were drafted. Congress had barred the new delegates from counting freedpeople fully for representation without the ballot, but Johnson's states were seated on his terms, not Congress's.
His Veto of the Freedmen's Bureau Bill in February 1866 Stunned Moderates
Congress passed a bill in February 1866 extending the Freedmen's Bureau's life, expanding its jurisdiction, and giving it military enforcement power in the former Confederate states. On February 19, 1866, Johnson vetoed it. His veto message argued the bill was unconstitutional, military occupation in peacetime, and extravagant. The Senate failed to override by a narrow margin.
The timing made the anger concrete. The Freedmen's Bureau had been created by the March 3, 1865 act, and its original authorization was set to expire one year after the war's end. Freedpeople and their allies expected the bureau to become a permanent instrument of protection during Reconstruction. Johnson's veto foreclosed that.
Congress had passed the bill with what moderates believed was a compromise. The veto message rejected the very principle that the federal government could supervise Southern civil rights. Johnson's argument was that the states were functioning and the freedpeople could rely on state courts.
Republicans reeled because Johnson had been elected on a Union ticket with Lincoln and was expected to support the party's program. The veto made him, in Foner's phrase, the leader of a self-defined conservative coalition. It also made the February bill a test vote on whether Congress could govern Reconstruction at all.
The vote to sustain the veto passed with the help of Democrats and conservative Republicans. From that point forward, the Republican majority saw Reconstruction legislation as a fight over whether Congress or the president controlled the terms of reunion.
His March 27, 1866 Veto of the Civil Rights Bill Was Overridden in April
Congress sent the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to Johnson in March. The bill declared freedpeople citizens, guaranteed them the same civil rights as white citizens, and gave federal courts jurisdiction over civil rights violations. Johnson vetoed it on March 27, 1866, on grounds that it discriminated in favor of Black Americans and intruded on state authority.
The veto's language matters because it inverted the bill's purpose. Johnson argued that federal protection for freedpeople violated the principle of equality. The same logic appeared in his Freedmen's Bureau objections.
Congress overrode the veto on April 9, 1866, by a vote of 33 to 15 in the Senate and 122 to 41 in the House, according to the records of the 39th Congress. The override passed with exactly the two-thirds required in the Senate. This was the first major piece of legislation in American history enacted over a presidential veto.
The Civil Rights Act's passage over Johnson's veto was a turning point. It was later the basis for parts of the Fourteenth Amendment's language and it established that the federal government had a role in guaranteeing freedpeople's legal equality. Johnson had lost the constitutional argument over who would define Reconstruction.
For readers tracing the vote arithmetic, the figures vary by source and by whether absent members are counted. The Senate tally of 33 to 15 is the official record; a different collector may report on the vote differently. The two-thirds requirement is fixed in Article I; the political climb was the difficulty.
The Vetoes and Pardons Together Made the 1866 Elections a Referendum
The national consequence is what the anger produced. In July 1866 the House passed the Freedmen's Bureau bill again and Congress overrode Johnson's second veto. Johnson campaigned across the Midwest that fall against the Radical program in an unprecedented speaking tour, and Republicans turned the remarks into campaign material. Between July 4 and Election Day in 1866, the Republican Party gained more than a two-thirds majority in both houses.
The result shaped the Reconstruction Acts of 1867, which divided the South into five military districts, required new state constitutions with Black suffrage, and imposed ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment as a condition of readmission. None of that happens without Johnson's vetoes and pardons convincing moderates that the president would not protect the freedpeople.
Johnson's speaking tour also handed Republicans a quote book. According to accounts compiled during the era, Johnson compared Radicals to traitors and said he would not be bullied. He returned to Washington with his position hardened and the Republican majority larger.
The election arithmetic is worth noting. The 1866 returns gave Republicans about 143 seats in the House and 57 in the Senate, according to standard tabulations of the 39th and 40th Congresses, which is more than the two-thirds needed to override vetoes. That is why Johnson's vetoes after 1866 failed.
The Impeachment Fight Grew Directly Out of This Record
The impeachment crisis of 1868 was not an accident of personality. Johnson dismissed Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, who controlled the Freedmen's Bureau's military authority, and Congress responded by passing the Tenure of Office Act in March 1867. When Johnson removed Stanton in February 1868, the House voted eleven articles of impeachment.
The articles against Johnson were broad, and they rested on the same charge of obstruction the vetoes had set up. His conduct of Reconstruction, not only the Stanton case, was the substance of the case. Johnson was acquitted in the Senate on May 16, 1868, by a single vote: 35 to 19, one short of two-thirds.
The lesson for readers is how a president's discretionary powers can be used to defeat a legislative program and how Congress responds with more legislation. The Tenure of Office Act was a novel and arguably unconstitutional attempt to control the executive, and Congress built the Reconstruction Acts alongside it. The battle was about the terms on which the vanquished South would be readmitted.
The acquittal meant Johnson finished his term. His successor, Ulysses S. Grant, took office on March 4, 1869, after the election of 1868. Grant's administration would enforce the Reconstruction and enforcement acts far more actively.
For comparative context, the Freedmen's Bureau's 1865–1872 lifespan tells a story of expiration by design. Congress renewed it through 1872 as part of appropriations, and it finally ended in 1872 with the education and relief work largely wound down.
His Pardons Also Worsened Freedpeople's Financial Position
The anger with Johnson was not only about race and law. It was about money. The Civil War had transformed $20,000 planters into the wealthiest and most politically connected class in the South, and Johnson's pardon process restored their claims on former lands where freedpeople had been settled. The field orders gave freedpeople the impression that the "forty acres" of Sherman's order, issued on January 16, 1865, would become property.
Johnson's administration did not create that expectation. Under the Freedmen's Bureau and the Treasury's abandoned property rules, land that had been confiscated from Confederates was leased to freedpeople and others. When Johnson pardoned former owners and returned their property, the leases were overridden and freedpeople were evicted from land they had been working.
On Edisto Island in South Carolina, freedpeople wrote a petition in October 1865 asking for land and warning what would happen if they were left in the former owners' hands. The response from the commissioner, in one widely quoted exchange, was that freedom was a fact and the government could not give them land. That exchange is the financial story in miniature.
The result was that the financial aid Congress proposed, and Johnson vetoed, was the alternative to a land program that had been tried and then revoked. The Southern Homestead Act of 1866 tried again with public land in five states, and that history is worth checking because its results are widely debated among historians.
A reader who wants to check a specific claim about land, labor contracts, or relief can use the Freedmen's Bureau records at the National Archives and the congressional debates of the 39th Congress. The specific numbers on how many acres were given out and to whom are not reliably established, so I do not give a figure.
His Vetoes Lost, and His Pardons Won Enough to Matter
The scorecard is blunt and useful. Johnson's major vetoes of civil rights and relief legislation were overridden or bypassed within weeks. His pardons and state recognition stuck. That asymmetry explains why the anger was so durable.
| Johnson action | Date | Congressional response | Result for freedpeople |
|---|---|---|---|
| Amnesty proclamation, 16 excluded classes, $20,000 threshold | May 29, 1865 | None; Andrew Johnson controlled pardon power | Planters and Confederate officials re-entered politics if pardoned individually |
| Special pardons to roughly 1,000 former Confederates in 1865 | 1865 | None | Confederate elite regained political and property claims |
| Recognized Southern state conventions | 1865 | Congress rejected seating in December 1865 | Black Codes enacted across Southern states |
| Veto of Freedmen's Bureau extension | February 19, 1866 | Reconsidered; later passed in July 1866 | Bureau's security work continued unevenly until 1872 |
| Veto of Civil Rights Act of 1866 | March 27, 1866 | Overridden April 9, 1866 | Federal civil rights protection established in law |
| Second Freedmen's Bureau veto | July 1866 | Overridden | Limited enforcement continued |
| Removal of Stanton | February 1868 | House impeachment, March 1868 | Trial acquittal May 16, 1868 |
The table's key row is the Idaho, the first two, which are the ones where Johnson got his way without Congress overriding him. His vetoes were overridden in this specific sense: Congress had the votes in the Senate on April 9 for the Civil Rights Act, and it kept overriding through 1866. But his pardons and his state conventions produced the Black Codes that the civil rights law had to combat.
The Pardon Power Was Never the Question; Its Use Was
The most precise way to describe Johnson's leniency is that it was a use of the pardon power broad enough to undo a war's political results. The pardon power itself is in the Constitution, and the question of how it should be exercised has been debated since the founding. Johnson used it to restore the political standing of the men who had made the war.
His May 29, 1865 proclamation required an oath of future loyalty rather than any acknowledgment of wrongdoing. The excluded classes could apply individually, and Johnson granted applications with little investigation. Foner documented that previous Confederates who took the oath and applied found the doors open, and Johnson's desire to hear them in person gave the pardons a theatrical quality.
The constitutional argument over Reconstruction was not about the pardon power's legality. It was about who would define the terms of readmission. By pardoning the old elite and recognizing their state governments, Johnson asserted that the president would define those terms.
The counterargument, which Radicals pressed, is that Congress had the authority to guarantee a republican form of government under Article IV. The Reconstruction Acts eventually settled the political question in Congress's favor. The legal question of the pardon power's breadth was never really tested.
The Veto Messages Themselves Became the Evidence
The vetoes were not just blockers. They were documents that revealed a theory of government, and that theory is what appalled moderates. The March 27, 1866 message said the Civil Rights Act would "discriminate against the white race" and establish "a system of negro supremacy" in the South. That wording is the key piece of evidence for the anger.
The Freedmen's Bureau veto argued the bill was a military measure in peacetime and an expensive bureaucracy. The message also said the bureau would delay the South's return to normal government. Read together, the documents say that the federal government should withdraw and the states should handle the freedpeople.
Congress entered the messages into the record and quoted them during the 1866 campaign. The campaign use is what makes the vetoes decisive. The public read Johnson's own words in Republican-aligned papers, and the backlash gave Republicans their margins.
The exception is worth noting for accuracy. The vetoes and overrides were about who would control Reconstruction, and they were not the last word. The Supreme Court's decisions in the period, including the 1873 Slaughter-House Cases, later narrowed the Fourteenth Amendment's reach, and that history is one readers should check.
The Angry Response Was Institutional, Not Personal
What made the era's opponents of Johnson effective was that they built institutions. The Joint Committee on Reconstruction, created in December 1865 and chaired by Senator William Pitt Fessenden, gathered testimony from the South and published reports that catalogued the violence and the Black Codes. The committee's report was the evidentiary basis for the Reconstruction Acts.
The overrides were possible because Republicans held more than two-thirds in both houses after 1866. The numbers are the engine of this history. Without the 1866 election gains, the Reconstruction Acts of March 1867 would have been vetoed and could not have been sustained.
The anger was also directed at a broader failure: Johnson's own party had expected him to be a Union man. His 1864 election as Lincoln's running mate on the National Union ticket had been a message of national unity. When he vetoed the Civil Rights Act in March 1866, he was rejecting the program of the party that had elected him.
The confirmation battle over the 1868 acquittal was the last institutional test. Radicals fell one vote short, and a change of one senator's vote would have removed him. The article record and the trial vote are in the congressional records, and the vote of 35 to 19 is the best-documented conclusion.
The Legacy for a Reader Trying to Understand Reconstruction
For a reader trying to make sense of Reconstruction as a whole, Johnson's presidency is a hinge. His leniency restored the Southern elite to political power within a year of the war's end. His vetoes signaled that the federal government would not enforce freedpeople's rights on his initiative. His defeat in the election of 1866 handed Reconstruction to Congress, and Congress's program was built in reaction.
The sequence of dates is the spine of the account. The May 29, 1865 amnesty proclamation, the December 1865 refusal to seat Southern congressmen, the February 19, 1866 Freedmen's Bureau veto, the March 27, 1866 Civil Rights veto and April 9 override, the July 1866 override of the second bureau veto, and the May 16, 1868 impeachment acquittal.
The numbers are the second spine. Sixteen excluded classes in the amnesty, roughly 1,000 special pardons in 1865, $20,000 as the property threshold, 33 to 15 and 122 to 41 the override votes, 35 to 19 the acquittal. Those are the facts that make the account testable.
Read together, the record shows something specific rather than vague. The leniency and the vetoes were a single policy: restore the old order and withdraw federal protection. The anger they produced was not a disagreement about details. It was a conclusion that the president had chosen the former Confederates over the freedpeople, and the elections and overrides were the institutional answer.
FAQ
How many former Confederates did Johnson pardon?
Johnson granted special pardons to roughly 1,000 former Confederates during 1865, according to historian Eric Foner's Reconstruction. The number of applications far exceeded the grants, and Johnson personally reviewed applications at the White House. The pardons covered planters, former Confederate officials, and several men covered by the $20,000 property exclusion. A precise national total for the full term remains a subject of archival count.
Was Johnson's Civil Rights Act veto actually overridden?
Yes. The House and Senate voted to override on April 9, 1866, with the Senate voting 33 to 15 and the House 122 to 41. That override made the Civil Rights Act of 1866 the first major U.S. law enacted over a presidential veto. Johnson had argued the act favored Black Americans; Congress disagreed by a two-thirds margin.
What was the Black Codes' connection to Johnson's pardon policy?
The men who returned to the Southern statehouses after Johnson's pardons and amnesty proclamation drafted the Black Codes of 1865 and 1866. The codes restricted freedpeople's employment, movement, and legal standing and were passed by state legislatures Johnson had recognized. Federal civil rights legislation was aimed at these laws. Reading the state codes alongside the amnesty proclamation shows the cause and effect.
Could Johnson have been removed from office?
The Senate acquitted Johnson by a single vote, 35 to 19 on May 16, 1868, one short of the two-thirds needed. A switch of one senator would have removed him, but that did not happen, and Johnson served out his term. The impeachment articles were broader than the Stanton removal, covering his Reconstruction conduct.
Did Johnson support any relief for freedpeople?
No federal program of land or direct relief survived Johnson's vetoes. His administration restored confiscated property to pardoned former owners, which removed freedpeople from land they had begun to work. The Freedmen's Bureau continued on a reduced footing until 1872. But the federal government's role in freedpeople's livelihood remained contested through his term.
How did the Freedmen's Bureau fare after the 1866 vetoes?
The bureau's life was extended over Johnson's veto in July 1866 and continued through and after Reconstruction until 1872. Its work focused on education, labor contracts, and relief, while military enforcement weakened as the army withdrew. The bureau never had the mandate Congress sought in February 1866 because the Senate failed to override that first veto by a close margin.
What happened to the Fourteenth Amendment under Johnson?
Congress passed the Fourteenth Amendment in June 1866 and sent it to the states; it was ratified in July 1868 over Johnson's opposition. Johnson had urged states to reject it, and the Reconstruction Acts required ratification as a condition of readmission. Later court decisions narrowed its reach, including the 1873 Slaughter-House Cases.
What should a reader check in primary sources?
The House and Senate journals of the 39th Congress, the veto messages of February 19, March 27, and July 1866, and the Joint Committee on Reconstruction's reports are the core records available at the National Archives and through the Library of Congress. The Freedmen's Bureau records document the land and labor disputes. Specific counts of pardons and land distributed are best confirmed in archival sources rather than secondary summaries.