Thomas Edison expected the Naval Consulting Board to serve as a small, expert body that would turn inventors' ideas into practical weapons and antidotes to submarine warfare, working with the Navy on his terms. He outlined that job in a 1915 letter to Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels and in an accompanying memorandum on preparedness. The board's actual record fell well short of that picture: it channeled thousands of proposals into Navy bureaus and backed the Naval Research Laboratory, but it produced no decisive antisubmarine weapon during the war and quickly settled into an advisory role Edison never intended.

Edison's expectations were specific, and so were the reasons the board drifted. Understanding both requires looking at the letter, the members, the proposals, the Navy's resistance, and the one institution the board did leave behind.

Edison's 1915 Letter Set the Board's Job in Writing

Edison put his terms in writing before he agreed to serve. His letter of October 7, 1915, to Daniels proposed a board chosen by Edison himself, with members drawn from the National Academy of Sciences and the great industrial laboratories, plus a "land board" of civilians and a "sea board" of naval officers. His memorandum of preparedness was specific about method: he wanted laboratories to keep working on private contracts while the Navy supplied problems, so promising devices could be developed quickly and in secret.

The most quoted line from the letter is his complaint that the Navy's officers were "not familiar with the progress of science," which is why he wanted men from outside the service at the table. He was equally clear about what he did not want: a committee that met occasionally and produced opinions. The men he named were working scientists and engineers, including Leo Baekeland, the chemist behind Bakelite, and the board's eventual chairman, the inventor Peter Cooper Hewitt. About 24 men were appointed to the civilian board, and Edison himself served as its head until late 1918, when he resigned and Hewitt took over.

The appointment came with a practical condition attached to Edison's time. He was the most famous inventor in America, but his laboratory work was his living, and his agreement to serve was tied to his belief that the board would be on call for specific problems. His letter reads as a working arrangement, not an honorific one.

The Board's Mandate: Inventions, Not Administration

Edison pictured the board as a clearinghouse for problems that only a laboratory could answer. The Navy would hand over a question such as how to detect a submarine from the air or how to protect a ship from torpedoes, and the board's civilian scientists would find the expertise or the method to solve it. The board would also act as a filter, shielding Navy bureaus from the flood of crank letters that arrive in wartime.

That filter function matters because the flood was real. Once the board became known, proposals arrived by the sack from the public, and the board's office handled them as a matter of routine. Edison's expectation was that the board would judge ideas with a scientist's eye and pass on only the plausible ones, so that an inventor with a genuine device would face a fair hearing and a Navy officer would not waste time on perpetual motion.

War work also put the board in touch with industry. Edison wanted the board to help factories convert to war production, and he expected the board to serve as a two-way channel between private laboratories and Navy procurement. The founding letter's emphasis on outside laboratories made this central rather than incidental.

The function he did not ask for was finance or command. The board had no authority to order equipment, no budget of its own, and no line role in the fleet. That distinction between advice and power is where the expectations and the reality parted ways.

The Twelve-Hour Days That Never Came: Edison's Work at the Navy's Request

Edison told the press he was prepared to work twelve hours a day, and he did begin a research program of his own. The Navy gave him space at the Brooklyn Navy Yard and a team, and he set out to solve the submarine problem himself.

His main idea was a scheme to evade torpedoes by maneuvering ships in formations or behind nets and screens, and the details were tested at sea. A contemporary account of the experiments describes trials with a decoy vessel and a real torpedo, in which the equipment failed to save the ship. Edison concluded that there was no practical method of protecting a ship from a torpedo attack, and he said so to the Navy.

That result is instructive because it is the opposite of what a reader might expect from Edison. His own attempt to invent an antisubmarine defense failed, which gave him an unusually clear view of what the board could and could not promise. The failure also shaped the board's later reputation: the most famous inventor in the country had personally tested a defense and found it wanting.

How the Navy Received the Board: Potter's Notice and the Bureaus' Cold Shoulder

The Secretary of the Navy's order creating the board gave it a broad mission, but the order did not make the Navy's bureaus cooperative. The board's critics included Rear Admiral William S. Sims, who later wrote a short, scathing history of its work.

Sims's account makes three charges. The board was composed of men who were given no real authority; its members were asked to advise on problems they had not been asked to identify; and the bureaus treated the board's suggestions as a nuisance. One famous anecdote has Sims pointing out that the Admiralty in London had a research organization that answered to the political head of the Navy, while the American board answered to no one in particular. The board's report of December 1917 has been described in the Navy's own records as containing nothing truly significant.

Competing accounts put the blame on the board itself. Some officers complained that the members were too old, that the men he named were not all physicists, and that a body with 24 members working part-time could not run a research program. The dispute is a fair warning to anyone reading wartime committee histories: the failure can be structural, personal, or both, and the record rarely settles the question.

The board did do the unglamorous work. It compiled the Navy's first list of inventions it wanted, judged thousands of submissions, and forwarded the promising ones to the bureaus. What it could not do was make the bureaus act on them.

The Torpedo Failure Shows What Edison Asked For and What He Got

The antisubmarine problem is the clearest test case. Edison's experiments with the decoy and the torpedo, conducted with a real torpedo and a dummy ship, are the best-documented attempt by a board member to solve the war's central naval problem. The trial was faithful to the board's method: a civilian inventor took a specific Navy problem, built the apparatus, and tested it at sea.

The result was negative, and the Navy accepted the finding. That is exactly how Edison wanted the board to work: a scientific judgment on a practical question, delivered by a man with no stake in a particular doctrine. The finding also ended Edison's personal work on the torpedo defense.

What the board never did was produce a workable new weapon. The Navy's big wartime innovation was the antisubmarine depth charge and the convoy system, and neither came out of the board's work. The board's own report found that its recommendations had not been adopted, and the reason is at least partly organizational: the bureaus controlled the money and the ships, and a civilian body with no line authority could not force a trial of a device it liked.

That gap between scientific advice and bureaucratic power is the heart of the answer to the question. Edison expected a working body. The Navy expected advice, and the board gave advice.

Thousands of Proposals, a Bureaucratic Funnel to the Bureaus

The board's volume of work is the part of its history that is easiest to underestimate. Proposals came in by the thousands, and the board's office had to screen each one, decide whether it deserved a trial, and route the plausible ones to the right bureau. The board kept a docket and a staff, and it published its findings.

Screening on that scale has its own logic. A board that says "interesting, send it over" to a bureau has done nothing, because the bureau has no staff to test civilian gadgets. So the board's staff had to sort the ideas itself, and the sorting was done with the expertise of its members rather than with a laboratory of its own.

A few items from the docket are instructive. The board's reports mention work on submarine detection, on listening devices, and on metal forming, and one proposal that drew attention was a scheme to weld ships with thermite. That item ended in rejection, and the record of why is thin, but the episode shows the board's real job: an expert filter, not a development house.

The filter job was useful. It saved the Navy from thousands of crank letters, and it gave a few inventors a fair hearing. It just was not the job Edison described in 1915.

The Naval Research Laboratory: The Board's One Lasting Institution

The board's most durable result was institutional. It supported the founding of the Naval Research Laboratory, which opened in 1923 at Bellevue in Washington and is the Navy's corporate research center to this day. The board's advocacy helped make the case for a permanent laboratory, and the laboratory's later work in radio, radar, and acoustics is its monument.

The laboratory's founding is also the clearest case of what the board could accomplish when it acted as a policy advocate. The board could not build the laboratory itself, and the construction money and the site came through the Navy's own channels, but the push for a permanent research facility came from the civilian side. A board with no line authority can still change what an institution does next.

The delay is the cautionary part. The war ended in November 1918, and the laboratory opened in 1923, which means the board's biggest success took five years past the armistice. Edison's expectation of quick, practical answers was not met within the war, and the one lasting institution arrived too late to help in it.

Edison's own verdict must be inferred, because he resigned before the armistice and left the chairman's work to Hewitt. What can be said is that the board he wanted and the board the Navy got were different bodies, and the difference was visible to everyone in it.

Why the Board's Advice Carried Little Weight

The board had no budget line and no procurement authority, and the bureaus that did have authority were judged on ships and guns, not on inventions. A civilian suggestion that threatened a bureau's program could be ignored with no consequence, and often was. Sims's account makes clear that the board's reports were seen as an intrusion.

There is also a mismatch of tempo. Edison expected problems to be answered in weeks by great laboratories. The Navy moved in contracts and trials, and a device that needed a sea trial in 1917 was unlikely to reach the fleet before 1918. The board's members, working part-time, could not run a crash program even if the Navy had asked them to.

The board's own composition compounded the problem. The men Edison named were distinguished, but many were not physicists, and a 24-member board dispersed among laboratories could not conduct a coherent research campaign. The board acted as a panel of consultants, and the Navy already had consultants.

Edison's own temperament made the last part harder. A man used to directing a laboratory of his own found himself one voice among many, and the board's work was mostly paper. The mismatch between his expectations and the institution he got is the short answer to the question.

Edison's Standards Versus the Board's Record

The question of whether the board performed to Edison's expectations can be answered with a direct comparison. The table below lines up what Edison asked for and what the record shows, with the sources identified in the text.

What Edison expected What the board delivered Verdict
A body of outside experts who could judge inventions A 24-member advisory board with a staff and a docket Partial: the membership was distinguished, but the board was large and part-time
A filter that could keep crank proposals from the bureaus A screening office that handled proposals by the thousand Achieved: the filter function worked
Quick development of devices needed by the Navy Recommendations that the bureaus generally did not adopt Failed: the board lacked authority to make trials happen
A secret, fast channel to private laboratories A public board with a published docket and no funding of its own Failed: the channel was public and unfunded
A permanent research institution for the Navy Advocacy that helped create the Naval Research Laboratory Achieved, but the laboratory opened in 1923, after the war
Work on the submarine problem by the board itself Edison's own torpedo experiments, which ended in a negative finding Mixed: the method worked, the result was no weapon

The table's pattern is that the board succeeded at the tasks that needed expertise and failed at the tasks that needed power. Edison's letter asked for expertise, but the war effort needed power.

That is why the question has no single answer. The board performed to his expectations on the parts he could control and fell short on the parts he could not. A reader looking for a one-line verdict should treat it as a qualified no.

FAQ

Did the Naval Consulting Board actually design any weapons?

No weapon fielded in World War I can be credited to the board's design work. Its main projects were screens and formations to defeat torpedoes, which were tested and rejected, and screening of outside proposals, which forwarded a few ideas to the bureaus. The board's legacy is the Naval Research Laboratory, a facility it advocated rather than built, which opened in 1923.

Why did Edison resign from the board?

He resigned in 1918, and Peter Cooper Hewitt took over as chairman. The reasons are not documented in a single public statement, and the letters and biographies do not settle the question. What is clear is that he had spent most of his wartime effort on his own torpedo-defense experiments, which ended in a negative finding, and the board's work had become mostly paperwork.

Did the board support the Naval Research Laboratory?

Yes, and that support is its most durable result. The laboratory opened at Bellevue in Washington in 1923 and became the Navy's central research facility, later known for work in radio, radar, and acoustics. The delay of five years past the armistice is the board's biggest limitation: the success arrived too late to matter in the war it was created for.

How does the board compare with the British Admiralty's research body?

The comparison favored the British in Sims's account, because the Admiralty's organization answered to the political head of the Navy and so had a route to authority. The American board had no such route, and its advice could be ignored by the bureaus without consequence. That structural difference, rather than the quality of the members, is the fairest explanation of the two bodies' different records.

How many members did the board have?

About 24 civilians were appointed, drawn from the National Academy of Sciences and the industrial laboratories, and the board also included a "sea board" of naval officers. The size is part of the critique: a body that large, meeting part-time, could not run a research program, and some officers called its members too old and too few of them physicists.

Did the board's work cost the Navy anything?

The board had no budget of its own, and its members served without pay, so its direct cost was staff and office expenses rather than a research program. The cost that matters is opportunity: the Navy spent the war without a functioning field laboratory, and the permanent laboratory it eventually built took until 1923 to open.