The officer was Lieutenant Colonel Claus Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg. On July 20, 1944, he carried two British-made explosive devices in a briefcase into a morning conference at the Wolf's Lair, Hitler's field headquarters near Rastenburg in East Prussia. He armed only one of them before entering the room, and that single charge — placed under an oak map table — went off at 12:42 p.m. It killed four men and wounded others. Hitler survived with minor injuries, and Stauffenberg was executed by firing squad the same night, shortly after midnight.
Who Claus von Stauffenberg Was and Why He Was Inside the Conference Room
Stauffenberg was a 36-year-old career cavalry officer from an old Catholic Swabian noble family, serving as chief of staff to the commander of the Replacement Army, General Friedrich Fromm. That posting gave him something almost no other conspirator had: routine, legitimate access to Hitler's briefings. Born in 1907 in Jettingen, he lost his left eye, his right hand, and two fingers of his left hand to a British fighter-bomber strafing attack in Tunisia on April 7, 1943. The wounds made his presence in the room plausible rather than suspicious.
He had been a late convert to the resistance. Stauffenberg initially welcomed the Nazi seizure of power and served the regime loyally in Poland, France, and North Africa. His turn came across 1942 and 1943, sharpened by the mass shootings and mistreatment he witnessed behind the Eastern Front and by the conviction that Germany was being led to ruin. By the time he was recruited into the conspiracy by his uncle, Nikolaus Graf von Üxküll-Gyllenband, and others in 1943, he was already pushing for a killing attempt rather than a coup alone.
His centrality was structural, not just symbolic. The plan for Operation Valkyrie — the emergency contingency designed to put down an internal uprising — depended on the Replacement Army mobilizing after Hitler's death. Fromm controlled that army. Stauffenberg, as Fromm's chief of staff, could issue the Valkyrie orders. That combination of physical access to Hitler and operational control of the coup machinery is why he both planted the bomb and ran the takeover from Berlin afterward.
His role came with a hard limit worth naming. Stauffenberg could only plant explosives on days when he could get into a conference, and he could arm devices only in private. His injuries meant a slow, awkward one-handed job of crushing the British pencil detonators, which is exactly the moment the plot failed at. The conspirators had attempted the killing at least twice before — the record usually cites an earlier attempt in March 1944 — and each time Stauffenberg either could not arm a device or the target did not appear.
What the Bombs Actually Were: British Plastic Explosive and a Crush-Fuse Timer
The charges were British-supplied sabotage kits using plastic explosive, generally identified in the historical record as Nobel 808, and a pencil-type time delay. The detonator worked by crushing a small copper tube, which released acid onto a spring-loaded striker; the acid ate through a wire, the striker fell, and the bomb went off. Crushing the tube made a soft click that a room of officers could plausibly hear, and setting it took a few seconds per device.
Stauffenberg flew from Berlin to Rastenburg that morning carrying the explosives in his briefcase. He had fabricated a pretext to attend the conference, which had been moved earlier from 1:00 p.m. to 12:30 p.m. — a schedule change that compressed his timeline. Arriving late, he had roughly minutes, not hours, before he needed to be in the room. The arming window shrank accordingly.
Two devices were carried, and only one was armed. The historical consensus, set out in the standard account by Peter Hoffmann and reflected in the German Resistance Memorial Center's documentation, is that Stauffenberg crushed one detonator but was interrupted before he could arm the second and left it in his briefcase or discarded it. One fuse was set to a delay of about ten minutes, a standard setting for the kit.
The British origin of the hardware matters for how the plot is judged. These were not improvised bombs built in a cellar; they were professional sabotage munitions with a known, fairly predictable delay. A ten-minute fuse was long enough for Stauffenberg to excuse himself and reach a car or aircraft, and short enough to catch the conference mid-session. It was the right choice for an escape. It was the wrong choice for killing everyone in a wood-frame room, because ten minutes is also long enough for a heavy table to be moved.
Why Only One of the Two Charges Was Armed
The most consequential decision of the day was a single act of omission. A second armed device would have roughly doubled the blast at the seat of the explosion, and the conference room was a lightweight timber structure, not a reinforced bunker. With both charges live, the historical judgment — expressed in the German Resistance Memorial Center's account and in Hoffmann's biography — is that the casualties would very likely have included Hitler.
Stauffenberg's interference problem was physical and social. He had one hand and three fingers; opening a briefcase, extracting a device, and crushing a copper tube takes two hands and concentration. Doing it in a corridor of a headquarters crawling with SS guards, adjutants, and orderlies, minutes before a conference, required him to find a private moment. That private moment kept failing to arrive. Accounts describe him arming the first device in a washroom or anteroom and being interrupted before the second.
He also had a schedule problem that compounded the physical one. Because he was running late and the conference had started without him, he walked in, placed the briefcase under the table near Hitler's position, and left with the excuse of a phone call. Leaving the second device unarmed meant the plot rested on one charge, one fuse, and one placement. Every later step — the table's heavy oak top, the open windows, the room's flimsy walls — reduced what that single charge could do.
Stauffenberg made a related gamble that historians still debate. He armed the charge on a ten-minute delay, and the shortest reliable setting meant he had to leave almost immediately to survive and to reach Berlin in time to run the coup. Waiting to confirm the explosion was impossible. The design assumed the bomb would work. The single-charge assumption is the plot's central failure case, and it is verifiable in the physical evidence: only one detonator was crushed, so only one charge fired.
The Briefcase Was Moved: The Oak Table and the Physics of the Miss
The conference met in a wooden guest hut with a heavy oak map table, and Stauffenberg placed the briefcase on the floor against the table's inside leg, about six feet from where Hitler stood. Colonel Heinz Brandt, an officer at the table, nudged the briefcase with his foot to get more room and then, finding it in his way, moved it to the far side of the table leg. That shift put the table's mass between the charge and Hitler.
At 12:42 p.m., the charge detonated. The oak tabletop and legs absorbed and deflected much of the blast upward and outward, and the hut's open windows vented the pressure. The roof partially collapsed. Four men died: Brandt himself, General Rudolf Schmundt, General Günther Korten, and stenographer Heinz Berger. Hitler suffered a perforated eardrum, burns, splinters, and shock, and appeared at the later Mussolini meeting with a bandaged head and a trembling right arm.
The room's construction is the decisive variable. A reinforced concrete bunker concentrates a blast. A timber hut with open windows does not. The combination of table mass, distance, a single charge, and a vented structure is why the assassination failed despite the bomb going off at the intended moment. Stauffenberg, watching from a distance, saw the explosion and assumed Hitler was dead, which is why the coup attempt proceeded in Berlin.
The physical evidence also explains an edge case often glossed over. Had the briefcase stayed where Stauffenberg set it, the table leg would not have absorbed the blast in the same way, and the German Resistance Memorial Center notes that the outcome would probably have been fatal for Hitler. The plot did not fail because of a dud, a faulty fuse, or a traitor flipping the plan. It failed because a piece of furniture moved a few inches.
The Coup in Berlin: Why Stauffenberg Spent the Afternoon on the Phone and in a Car
Stauffenberg flew back to Berlin and reached the Bendlerblock, the army headquarters on Bendlerstrasse, by early evening, convinced Hitler was dead. The coup machinery was already turning. Operation Valkyrie orders went out to military districts, and conspirators moved to arrest Nazi officials and seize control. Major Otto Ernst Remer's Grossdeutschland guard battalion was deployed on the strength of Stauffenberg's word, not on confirmed news of Hitler's death.
The coup collapsed on information. When word spread that Hitler had survived — through a radio broadcast and a direct call from Hitler to Remer's superior — officers who had joined the coup began to peel away. General Fromm, who had initially been detained by the conspirators and then turned, set up a drumhead court-martial in the building. Stauffenberg was shot by firing squad in the courtyard of the Bendlerblock in the early hours of July 21, 1944, together with First Lieutenant Werner von Haeften, Colonel Albrecht Ritter Mertz von Quirnheim, and General Friedrich Olbricht. Fromm ordered the executions and then had himself declared a victim of the plot.
The failure at the point of the bomb cascaded through the coup. Had Hitler died, the Valkyrie orders and Remer's troops would have faced a leadership vacuum; the conspirators' plan assumed that Hitler's death would paralyze the regime. With Hitler alive and broadcasting, the legal basis for the arrests evaporated. The coup was defeated not by force but by a confirmed voice on the radio. Western Allied radio and the German state broadcaster both carried news of the survival, and that was enough.
The Bendlerblock courtyard is now a memorial site. Executions there and the subsequent Gestapo roundup produced a wave of arrests and trials. The People's Court under Roland Freisler tried and condemned hundreds, and the executions ran into the thousands including the wider network. Stauffenberg's own brother Berthold and other family members were arrested and killed. The single unarmed charge did not just spare Hitler; it set off a reprisal that consumed the resistance network.
What Historians Agree On and Where the Accounts Diverge
The basic answer is closed: Stauffenberg planted the bomb. He was the only officer present who carried the device, armed it, placed it, and left. No serious account assigns the planting to another participant. Where the accounts differ is in the fine reconstruction of minutes, and that matters for anyone planning to cite specifics.
The German Resistance Memorial Center, which documents the Bendlerblock and the July 20 plot, supports the outline above: Stauffenberg armed one of two devices, placed the briefcase under the oak table, and left before the explosion. Peter Hoffmann's biography of Stauffenberg remains the standard scholarly treatment in English and German and supplies much of the detail about the British fuses and the arming sequence. Ian Kershaw's biography of Hitler treats the plot as plausible in intent and compromised in probability.
The divergences are narrow. They concern exactly where in the room Stauffenberg armed the first device, whether the second was left in a corridor, a car, or a washroom, and the precise seconds of the fuse delay. A detail worth flagging for anyone researching this: sources sometimes give the fuse delay as ten minutes, sometimes a range, and the difference reflects reconstruction rather than a conflict of substance. What does not diverge is the count of armed devices — one — and the count of charges carried — two.
The choice of target room and the arming window draw on memoirs, testimony from survivors, Gestapo interrogation files, and post-war investigation. That evidence base supports the argument that the second device was both carried and left unarmed. Careless retellings sometimes say both bombs exploded or that the fuse failed. Neither is accurate. The fuse worked; the second charge was never armed.
The Men Executed at the Bendlerblock on the Night of July 20
The executions in the courtyard are part of the answer in a broader sense, because they show how quickly the plot's own authors became its casualties. Fromm convened a rushed court-martial and ordered four men shot. The table below sets out who they were and what role each played in the plot's machinery at the Bendlerblock.
| Name | Rank or role | Connection to the bomb and coup |
|---|---|---|
| Claus Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg | Lieutenant Colonel | Carried and armed the single device, placed the briefcase, flew to Berlin to direct the coup |
| Friedrich Olbricht | General of Infantry | Head of the General Army Office, co-organizer of Valkyrie's use as a coup instrument |
| Albrecht Ritter Mertz von Quirnheim | Colonel | Stauffenberg's immediate superior at the General Army Office, signed Valkyrie orders |
| Werner von Haeften | First Lieutenant | Stauffenberg's adjutant, accompanied him to Rastenburg, handled the second briefcase and explosives |
The four were shot by a firing squad of roughly ten men in the courtyard shortly after midnight. Fromm's court-martial was irregular even by the standards of the regime, and the executions were carried out before any higher authority could take over. Haeften's role is often understated: he was with Stauffenberg throughout the Rastenburg trip and handled the explosives, and accounts describe him throwing himself in front of Stauffenberg at the execution. The trial and execution of other conspirators followed over months.
Why the Duplicate Bombs and the British Hardware Still Matter to the Answer
Anyone retelling July 20 tends to compress the question to "who planted the bomb" and stop there. The fuller answer includes what kind of bomb and how many. The hardware was British sabotage plastic explosive with acid-delay detonators, supplied through the British Special Operations Executive's sabotage pipeline and delivered via the resistance network. The German resistance did not have a domestic supply of reliable timers of that quality.
Two devices gave redundancy, but only one was armed, so the redundancy was lost. A ten-minute fuse gave Stauffenberg an escape window but also let the table's mass and the hut's venting do their work. The single-charge, one-fuse, one-placement configuration is the entire technical story. Set against it, the postwar argument that the plot was doomed is too fatalistic; a second armed charge would probably have changed the outcome, per the German Resistance Memorial Center's account.
The British origin adds a legal and political dimension that constrains the historical claim. Supplies came through foreign intelligence channels, which makes this a case of an internal German conspiracy using external sabotage equipment. That is a fact the standard sources accept, and it helps explain the fuse behavior. The packaging and fuse type were known to Allied planners, which is why the timing sequence works as described rather than as an improvised mechanism.
Frequently Asked Questions
Was Stauffenberg the only person who carried a bomb into the Wolf's Lair that day?
No. His adjutant Werner von Haeften traveled with him and handled the second device and explosives, and he was executed alongside Stauffenberg shortly after midnight. The historical record credits Stauffenberg with arming and placing the charge that detonated, and Haeften with carrying and assisting. That distinction matters because it explains how a man with one hand managed to transport two British sabotage kits into a tightly guarded headquarters.
Did both bombs fail, or did the fuse malfunction?
Neither. The single armed device detonated at 12:42 p.m., and the fuse is not reported as faulty in the German Resistance Memorial Center's account or in Peter Hoffmann's biography. The second charge was never armed, which is a different kind of failure: not a dud and not a misfire, but an omission caused by interruption and time pressure. Retellings that describe a failed fuse confuse the second, unarmed device with a malfunctioning one.
How close was the briefcase to Hitler?
Roughly six feet when Stauffenberg set it down against the oak table leg. Colonel Heinz Brandt then moved it to the far side of that leg with his foot, which put the table's mass between the charge and Hitler. That repositioning is the most-cited single reason the blast was survivable. The German Resistance Memorial Center's account supports the view that without the move, the charge would probably have killed Hitler.
Why didn't Stauffenberg arm both bombs?
He was interrupted and out of time. Arming each device required two hands to crush the copper detonator tube, and his injuries meant the job was slow. The conference had started early, his arrival was late, and he needed to leave the room before the blast to survive and reach Berlin. He armed one and left with the other, a sequence reconstructed from testimony and described in Hoffmann's biography.
Did anyone else plant a bomb in a different room or building?
No credible account places a second bomb elsewhere on July 20. The plot depended entirely on Stauffenberg's device in the conference hut. The wider conspiracy involved hundreds of people across Berlin, Paris, Vienna, and other posts, but their role was to seize control after the killing, not to plant parallel charges. That organizational structure is why the coup collapsed the moment Hitler's survival was confirmed on the radio.
What happened to the officers who arrested the conspirators at the Bendlerblock?
General Friedrich Fromm, who ordered the executions and then claimed to have been a victim of the plot, was himself later arrested and shot by the regime in March 1945 when his role could no longer be concealed. His drumhead court-martial and prompt executions were an attempt to bury his own knowledge of the conspiracy. The German Resistance Memorial Center documents this sequence.
How do the July 20 dead compare with the total executions after the plot?
The four shot in the Bendlerblock courtyard overnight were the beginning, not the total. Gestapo arrests and People's Court trials under Roland Freisler followed for months, and the executions across the wider network ran into the thousands when the whole resistance network is counted. Exact totals vary by how the boundary is drawn, so check the German Resistance Memorial Center for the documented figure rather than a single number.
Where can I see the room where the bomb went off?
The Wolf's Lair near Kętrzyn in present-day Poland is a ruin; the conference hut was destroyed in the war and the site is now a memorial. The Bendlerblock courtyard in Berlin, where Stauffenberg was executed, is the German Resistance Memorial Center's main site and is open to visitors. For the physical layout of the conference room, the memorial center's documentation and Hoffmann's biography carry the reconstructed plan.